Brazilian Carnival: a guide for the perplexed.

março 30, 2011

(versão original em inglês do meu artigo, publicado em dezembro de 2010 pela Yod, revista italiana de cinema, comunicação e interdisciplinaridade)

Juliana de Albuquerque Katz

Philosophy Student at Tel Aviv University

juliana.albuquerque@gmail.com

A small account of Brazilian Carnival through the eyes of a Philosophy student trying to understand her own country and its culture. As a mix of narrative and Philosophical enquire, the article aims to cause a reflection about gender discrimination and its probable genesis in Brazil. From the letter of Pero Vaz de Caminha to the poems of Ascenso Ferreira the author observes an increasing objectification of women which makes her ask herself about the Brazilian ethical behavior through History. Which, in fact, would explain the difficulty to analyze how Brazilian values are built in a context of social and moral permissibility. Would Brazil be more intelligible if dealt as an Ethical-Aesthetical project such as in some of Darcy Ribeiro’s reflections? If so, how can we think of using the notions of body and sexuality to reinterpret the concept of the Hegelian recognition in order to prove with Simone de Beauvoir that the first step towards acknowledging the other should be affectivity and not conflict? Thus, what does our current Aesthetic vices tell us about the constant objectification of women? Do women take part of an Ethical world or are they set aside as an absolute other? To the author this is the riddle Momus casts upon us all. Key-words: Carnival, Brazilian Culture, Recognition, Gender Discrimination.

I

It is Saturday morning and the streets of Recife’s commercial center are packed with people. They all dress very differently from their daily clothing. Instead of the seriousness of the socially accepted disguises it is time to come out of the closet and chose to be oneself beyond its limitations. Supermen, ballerinas, Indians and even Carlitos seem to invade the streets. Some men dress as women and some women dress in minimalistic clothes. They dance and sing nonstop.

Street vendors walk along with the crowd selling cold beer with buckets pilled on their heads. I can’t find any coins in my pocket and another person pays for my drink. We instantly become friends. It’s an everlasting Carnival friendship until the next corner of the street where we take different directions. I head to the main bridge in town where an enormous and colored rooster stands still although the crowd seems to make the entire city vibrate. I am inside the famous Galo da Madrugada, the world’s biggest carnival street party that involves at least three traditional commerce neighborhoods in the city of Recife. The party starts at Bairro de São José, continues at Bairro de Santo Antônio where it apparently achieves its zenith at Avenida Guararapes, although the crowd also invades the city center main avenue already in Bairro da Boa Vista. Overall, a crowd of at least 1.5 million people follow the party on its 9 Km route.

It is insane! The heat is unbearable and can only be overcome by the beer. Suddenly everybody seems to be drunk and irreverence takes place. Men grab women by the arm and kiss experiencing no trace of resistance but reciprocity. People watching the party from above the old buildings start to dance on the edge of their balconies. Everywhere there is the smell of sweat, urine, ether and marijuana.

For the next three days not only Recife but the entire country will slow down and get involved in an atmosphere of consented social misdemeanors. In Salvador, crowds will follow the famous trios elétricos, modified cars with ultra-potent sound-systems, on the top of which artists such as Caetano Veloso, Gilberto Gil and Daniela Mercury sing and dance to the rhythm of Axé Music. In Rio de Janeiro many people will watch samba schools perform on Sunday and Monday evenings. But street parties are also bound to happen in many of Rio’s neighborhoods. In fact, street parties are the main characteristic of Brazilian Carnival. Nevertheless, although they seem to acquire a different flavor in each one of the country’s regions due to Brazil’s diverse cultural and ethnical formation, their essence still the same: the struggle of the people in forming a Brazilian identity freed from the historical oppression of illegitimate political elites.

Thus the atmosphere of social misdemeanors; which is a more exuberant picture of the historical Brazilian people’s relaxed threshold of moral values: a consented and decadent people’s revolution.

Such characteristic of this population is well examined by the historical documentation in Sérgio Buarque de Holanda’s book História Geral da Civilização Brasileira. In this work, the author quotes Bishop Pero Fernandes Sardinha report to the King of Portugal «many more things ought to be dissimulated instead of punished in such a new land (…)» (Holanda, 1963:119) A quote that can be accidently linked to the 20th century Chico Buarque’s Carnival tune that celebrates the inexistence of sin bellow the Equator.

II

This historical context of social and moral permissibility marks my difficulty to explain to my foreign colleagues how our values are built if the concepts of sin and, consequently, redemption do not seem to take effective part of our social structure.

One should try to understand Brazil as an Ethical-Aesthetic project. Something like Darcy Ribeiro’s idea of a “Brasil bonito” and, therefore, one should have the courage to face Brazilian reality. Only then, the country and its manifestation will acquire some intelligibility and let itself be spoken of.

I struggle to analyze the issue of Brazilian ethical behavior through the History of a Aesthetic clash between Civilization and Eros. Such clash in our national History has its roots well fixed 510 years ago, when the first Europeans arrived at the newly discovered Terra de Vera Cruz, and nowadays, is well portrayed by the annual Carnival season with the exploitation of female image.

In this case, the History of such exploitation dates back in the 16th century when Pero Vaz de Caminha wrote a letter to the Portuguese king about the marvelous newly discovered land and its inhabitants – the native South American Indian tribes. And those natives (male and female) as portrayed by Caminha were of such beauty and innocence that they would walk around naked without a trace of shame on the presence of strangers.

Needless to say that in many quotes from the letter, Caminha attains himself to the elaborate description of female beauty and writes to the king about their round bodies and gracious genitalia. To which, he states, are of such a beauty that would cause envy to the European ladies of the court.

Nowadays, however, the European ladies of the court exchanged places with middle- class women who year after year sit in front of their television sets to watch the traditional advertisement of the carnival season broadcast by Rede Globo (the country’s largest television company).

My early Carnival memories go back to this traditional advertisement. Since 1991, its video take presents a mulata dancing frenetically to the rhythm of samba while being stripped out of colorful make-up in order to become a bit more naked in every annual season.

The envy felt by many women over the image of the beautiful mulata is indeed the result of a lack of confidence of average female to self-image and reliance to the body nurtured on the female while on the early stages of formation of her social character, a fact that has been examined since Simone de Beauvoir’s writing of Le Deuxième Sexe.

According to the French philosopher, not to have confidence in the body is not to have confidence in oneself which lead us to figure out that the body should be understood as the objective expression of the subject (Beauvoir, 1986: 93, vol. II). Such a theory was drawn by the Husserlian concept of Leib, and later adopted by Maurice Merleau-Ponty in his work Phenomenology of Perception in the notion of corps vivant which Beauvoir was familiar with and evolved in her works, most notably Le Deuxiéme Sexe and Pour une morale de l’ambigüité.

I want the reader to focus on the sole idea of the body being the objective expression of the subject. Because, if it is so, what can be said about the situation of women in Brazil due to the fact that their body is only recognized as an object instead of being acknowledged as the expression of her self?

Ascenso Ferreira (1895-1963) is a well-known Brazilian poet. In his works he portraits regional themes from northeastern Brazil. In one of his verses about Carnival he says: «I saw the Genius of the Race!/ (I bet you think I will talk about Rui Barbosa)/ How!/ The Genius of the Race that I saw was that little chocolate mulata/ doing the siricongado step/ on Tuesday of carnival!»ii.

In the poem, a man envisions a woman’s perfection as being a mouth-watering chocolate colored mulata. The relation of a food in order to describe the woman’s main features should be rated as offensive wasn’t for Ferreira’s poetic efforts. As a matter of fact, such a comparison shows nothing that can be considered remarkable but for the fact that it consolidates a female image as man’s mere object of immediate satisfaction.

To this fact one can picture gender relations in Brazilian cultural expressions to be quite precarious. In fact, they are an emulation of medieval European content. And, therefore, they betray Darcy Ribeiro’s theoretical utopia of a new Tropical Civilization.

III

Now, to understand how such a Tropical Civilization would be possible, one must understand the Carnival phenomenon not as a mere transgression of traditional imposed values, but as a synthesis of values and as an adaptation of all the other civilizations taking part on a larger than life tropical attitude.

Thus, the simple emulation of medieval European content to the gender relations in the country already sounds as an imposed value due to suffer a modification. And such a change can be set in motion if we reinterpret the Hegelian concept of Recognition through the application of body and sexuality as its possible fundamental tools – which would bring us face to face to the fact that the living body is indeed part of our situation.

To the mulata in Ferreira’s poem or simply to any other Brazilian female, this should mean a chance to become free and to actually take part on the social and political process of the making of a country and of a new tropical civilization.

In this new tropical civilization, Carnival would play a true revolutionary role. It would remodel affective relations and our way to face the other, which would not be seen as menace, or as the unknown absolute different; but as one like me which I am able to love. Such feeling would extrapolate particular relations and occupy an ethical function in providing grounds for a universal recognition and the legitimacy of political institutions.

Let Carnival be an open invitation to acknowledge the other. In the previous paragraphs I quoted Pero Vaz de Caminha. One should attentively read his letter and examine the way in which the Indians received the Portuguese travelers. It might have been innocent but it was not naïve: it was a phenomenological approach. They were open and ready to witness the unveiling of their Portuguese counterparts. If only the Portuguese were bound to ascribe themselves in the same movement without attributing the new land and its inhabitants the weight of being «(…) the paranoid and salvationist extension of Portugal and Iberia (…)»iii we might have had the courage to develop a tropical civilization from our very beginning.

Those were my thoughts as I left Galo da Madrugada already late in the afternoon but they soon deemed away as I, perplexed, entered the night and found myself new adventures to play.

——

i The Tramp or Charlot: a Charles Chaplin character.

ii «Eu vi o Gênio da Raça!!!/(Aposto como vocês estão pensando que eu vou falar de Rui Barbosa.)/Qual!/O Gênio da Raça que eu vi/foi aquela mulatinha chocolate/ fazendo o passo do siricongado/ na terça-feira de carnaval!»

iii Ribeiro, Darcy. in Ferraz, Isa Grinspum. Intérpretes do Brasil. Documentary. Brazil, Versátil Home Video, 2002.

Ackowledgments: To Marcelo Dascal, Pedro de Albuquerque and Frederico Jayme Katz for the discussions and for the patience.

Bibliography:

Beauvoir, Simone de. Le deuxième sexe, vol I, II. Éditions Gallimard, Paris, 1986.

Beauvoir, Simone de. Por uma moral da ambigüidade. Nova Fronteira, Rio de Janeiro, 2005.

Caminha, Pero Vaz. Carta a El Rei D. Manuel. Dominus, São Paulo, 1963.

Grinspum, Isa. Intérpretes do Brasil. Documentary. Brazil, Versátil Home Video, 2002.

Hegel, G.W.F. Fenomenologia do Espírito. Editora Vozes, Petrópolis-RJ, 2002.

Holanda, Sérgio Buarque de. História Geral da Civilização Brasileira. Difusão Européia de Livros, São Paulo, 1963.

Katz, Juliana de Albuquerque. Ética, Reconhecimento e Ambigüidade: um diálogo entre Hegel e Simone de Beauvoir. Universidade Católica de Pernambuco, Centro de Ciências Jurídicas, Recife-BR, 2009.

Merleau-Ponty, Maurice. Phenomenology of Perception. Routledge, New York, 2002.


Husserl e Heidegger.

agosto 8, 2010

Fernando Pessoa.

julho 3, 2010

“O horror metafísico de Outrem!
O pavor de uma consciência alheia
Como um deus a espreitar-me!
Quem me dera
Ser a única [cousa ou] animal
Para não ter olhares sobre mim!”

(O Primeiro Fausto, III Tema: da falência do prazer e do amor)


Lars Vilks – O que é a arte?

junho 16, 2010

Série de cinco vídeos produzidos por Lars Vilks para intensificar o debate sobre a arte.


Uma pequena História do Mundo.

junho 10, 2010

Gombrich escreveu Uma pequena história do mundo enquanto trabalhava na sua tese de doutorado. O livro foi originalmente escrito em alemão e, publicado em 1936, em Viena.

Na época, o autor passava por dificuldades financeiras, e recebeu uma proposta para escrever um livro de história para crianças, através de um projeto editorial chamado Wissenschaften für Kinden.

Uma pequena História não tem a pretenção de substituir os livros didáticos. Mas, é uma leitura obrigatória para todos aqueles que pretendem educar as suas crianças através de fortes valores humanísticos: uma necessidade para os tempos atuais.


Zarathustra.

maio 25, 2010

“Of all that is written, I love only what a person hath written with his blood. Write with blood, and thou wilt find that blood is spirit.

It is no easy task to understand unfamiliar blood; I hate the reading idlers.

He who knoweth the reader, doeth nothing more for the reader. Another century of readers—and spirit itself will stink.

Every one being allowed to learn to read, ruineth in the long run not only writing but also thinking.

Once spirit was God, then it became man, and now it even becometh populace.

He that writeth in blood and proverbs doth not want to be read, but learnt by heart.

In the mountains the shortest way is from peak to peak, but for that route thou must have long legs. Proverbs should be peaks, and those spoken to should be big and tall.

The atmosphere rare and pure, danger near and the spirit full of a joyful wickedness: thus are things well matched.

I want to have goblins about me, for I am courageous. The courage which scareth away ghosts, createth for itself goblins—it wanteth to laugh.

I no longer feel in common with you; the very cloud which I see beneath me, the blackness and heaviness at which I laugh—that is your thunder-cloud.

Ye look aloft when ye long for exaltation; and I look downward because I am exalted.

Who among you can at the same time laugh and be exalted?

He who climbeth on the highest mountains, laugheth at all tragic plays and tragic realities.

Courageous, unconcerned, scornful, coercive—so wisdom wisheth us; she is a woman, and ever loveth only a warrior.

Ye tell me, “Life is hard to bear.” But for what purpose should ye have your pride in the morning and your resignation in the evening?

Life is hard to bear: but do not affect to be so delicate! We are all of us fine sumpter asses and she-asses.

What have we in common with the rose-bud, which trembleth because a drop of dew hath formed upon it?

It is true we love life; not because we are wont to live, but because we are wont to love.

There is always some madness in love. But there is always, also, some method in madness.

And to me also, who appreciate life, the butterflies, and soap-bubbles, and whatever is like them amongst us, seem most to enjoy happiness.

To see these light, foolish, pretty, lively little sprites flit about—that moveth Zarathustra to tears and songs.

I should only believe in a God that would know how to dance.

And when I saw my devil, I found him serious, thorough, profound, solemn: he was the spirit of gravity—through him all things fall.

Not by wrath, but by laughter, do we slay. Come, let us slay the spirit of gravity!

I learned to walk; since then have I let myself run. I learned to fly; since then I do not need pushing in order to move from a spot.

Now am I light, now do I fly; now do I see myself under myself. Now there danceth a God in me.—

Thus spake Zarathustra.”


Sartre: Anarquia e Moral.

maio 22, 2010

"Seria uma moral da esperança, pois a esperança é um valor, uma vez que a realidade da sociedade anarquista não é para amanhã."


ANARCHY AND MORALITY: INTERVIEW WITH JEAN-PAUL SARTRE.
Entrevista concedida a R. FORNET-BETANCOURT, M. CASAÑAS e A. GOMES.
Publicada originalmente na revista espanhola de filosofia Concordia, n.º 1, 1982.
Baixe Aqui: sartremoraleanarquia

Hannah Arendt: a stranger from abroad.

maio 17, 2010

Em Israel, as livrarias são pequenas e, nem sempre, possuem uma grande variedade de títulos. O comum por aqui é sempre encontrar livros sobre a situação política do país, sobre a história e fundação do Estado de Israel, algumas leituras sobre pensadores judeus e, evidentemente, livros de religião.

Para quem gosta de livros e pretende visitar o país sugiro que esqueça as grandes redes de livrarias e que coloque no roteiro de viagem as bibliotecas universitárias e os sebos.

A única exceção entre as livrarias israelenses é  a Librairie du Foyer – a livraria francesa que fica no coração de Tel Aviv.  Um lugar acolhedor e repleto de bons títulos de literatura e, principalmente, de filosofia.

De qualquer maneira o impossível sempre acontece e muitas vezes a gente acaba encontrando um livro excepcional entre as porcarias que se vendem nas livrarias comuns.

Foi o que aconteceu comigo ontem quando entrei na papelaria da Universidade. Fui lá comprar uns marca-textos e dei de cara com um livro sobre Hannah Arendt e Martin Heidegger. Não tive dúvidas: comprei, levei para casa e comecei a ler imediatamente.

"I have been anxious the last few days, suddenly overcome by an almost bafflingly urgent fear...I love you as I did on the first day - you know that, and I have always known it...The path you showed me is longer and more difficult than I thought. It requires a long life in its entirety...I would lose my right to live if I lost my love for you, but I would lose this love and its reality if I shirked the responsability (to be constant) it forces on me.”

A stranger from abroad é um bom livro e busca uma aproximação objetiva sobre o relacionamento entre os dois filósofos. O que inclui, claro, a questão do envolvimento de Heidegger com o Nazismo e a ulterior reaproximação de Arendt com o seu antigo professor e amante após a Segunda Guerra Mundial.

O próprio subtítulo do livro indica a direção dos acontecimentos: Hannah Arendt, Martin Heidegger, Friendship and Forgiveness. O que empresta a figura de Arendt uma tremenda compreensão do mundo e uma apaixonante capacidade de compreender e reconhecer o outro através do seu próprio desvelamento.

O livro esclarece e desmente uma série de estórias como a referente ao provável ressentimento de Arendt em relação a sua origem judaica. Hipótese que foi explorada por inúmeros críticos do seu pensamento – principalmente os críticos do seu conceito de banalidade do mal.

A Stranger from Abroad é realmente uma leitura recomendada para qualquer interessado na vida e na obra de Hannah Arendt.


Thinking about Phenomenology – part. I.

maio 13, 2010

(I wrote this as part of an exercise about Phenomenology and Direct Realism that I did for University and to which I still did not recieve a feedback. Anyway, I decided to post it on the blog just to give people an idea about what I’ve been thinking about lately. As soon as I recieve a feedback I intend to post further observations in a new text. Critique is welcome).

Juliana de Albuquerque Katz


Intentionality implies that every conscience is conscience of something. Therefore, it pictures the relation between the psychological state of the subject and its reference to an intended object. It is a concept based on Aristotle and Scholastic Philosophy that was brought back to discussion by Franz Brentano. An important feature of intentionality is that it helps the identification of psychical and physical phenomenon. The first features and original intentionality while the later only has derived intentionality.

To say that I see a black bird standing on an electric wire through by bedroom window is to say that what relates my conscience to its object is an act of perception to which the content of the object is disclaimed. Thus, whenever we express a mental state in language we are speaking about an intentional act.

But if the conscience comprehends an action towards something then how are our consciences supposed to work in order to have knowledge of the object? If we defend the idea of a direct relation between the subject and the object of its intention we fall into a Direct Realism, which is a doctrine whose main claim is that the senses provides us with the direct awareness of the world. One of the exponents of this doctrine was the 18th century thinker Thomas Reid to whom representationalism should be rejected otherwise we would turn ourselves into victims whether of skepticism of the external world or phenomenalism. To defend such idea would be the same as saying: I directly perceive the bird standing on the electric wire. Against the phenomenalist point of view that I perceive the bird standing on the electric wire trough sense data related to this fact. Thus, the direct realist does not care about sense data at all – the object of our perception is the world and not the mind and its sense data.

Therefore, if I imagine a toothless purple monster it won’t be really relevant to the direct realist because according to the doctrine’s point of view we do not have perception of sensations or even images. I’ll say it more clearly: to the direct realist we can only have perception of external objects which is not the case with me imagining such a monster or even to the fact that I like George’s character from Seinfield.

Other case that wouldn’t be relevant to the direct realist would be me feeling afraid of a dog standing in front of me. Of course that I would have perception of the dog standing in front of me as it surely is an external object. But, I would not have perception of my sensation of fear. Which sounds strange because how can I not have perception of what goes on in my mind? But then and again, it is not a coincidence that direct realism is known as naïve realism.

Now, suppose the bird on the wire wasn’t really an actual bird but puppet or even an illusion. With that we come across the fact that the object I saw doesn’t exist, which puts Direct Realism in the middle of a crossroad. How can its doctrine explain misperceptions? It can only do so by making use of hypothetic-deductive methods, which imply a previous experience and analysis of the phenomenon.

A straw seems to bend when submerged in a cup of soda because it is an optical illusion caused by the misunderstanding of an optical rule. In fact, we know that the straw remains straight inside the cup of soda because we had previous experiences of the same type that informed us of such a fact. To say so, would imply in totally agreeing with Thomas Reid thinking that to everything there is a natural explanation.

But the thing is: nothing is that simple and one can’t have total grasp of reality by experience only. Ideas or sense data are still necessary to explain a whole lot of things such as the purple monster example given above.

In a very interesting article about Reid’s Philosophy of Mind, Rebecca Copenhaver states: “We have no observational evidence for the existence of ideas – understood as images or resemblances of extra-mental objects – and even if we had such evidence, their existence would be insufficient for explaining how our experiences, thoughts, beliefs and other mental states come to be directed at or about objects. In other words, ideas are insufficient to explain the intentionality of our mental states.” (p.280) Thus, pointing the difficulty in a direct realist approach to intentionality.

To this perspective, some critics of Direct Realism make use of the argument from illusion that defends the idea that if we firstly perceive the bend straw it is because we firstly perceive sense data about the straw, and not the straw itself which, by all means, would be straight and not bend, proving that we have indirect perception of the actual straw.

Another answer to the question about how our consciences have knowledge of its objects derives from Phenomenology. But in which grounds is Phenomenology in a better position than Direct Realism? Or, in what way can a phenomenological approach towards intentionality overcome Direct Realism’s difficulty towards that same concept?

As already said, to Direct Realism the object of our perception is the world and the external objects and not the mind and its sense data. And, as a consequence this generates a certain difficulty for the direct realist to explain misperceptions.

But misperceptions and objects that don’t exist are still a phenomenon. Therefore, they can be considered to be objects to which our intentional mental acts are directed. To Robert Sokolowski Phenomenology proves the publicity of the mind because the conceptions of an intra-mental and of an extra-mental world are incoherent. To the author: everything is external. And he goes further: “While discussing intentionality, Phenomenology helps us to demand a public sense of thought, of reasoning and of perception. (…)” (p.21).

This is quite coherent to the words of Martin Heidegger in Being and Time. Heidegger explains that a phenomenon is something that reveals itself or that presents itself for itself. And, furthermore, he explains that “the phenomenon constitute the totality of what is under the light of day or can be put under that light. Something that the Greeks sometimes identified with beings, the totality of all that is.” (p.67).

A very interesting thing is that the beings can present themselves in a myriad of ways which includes the possibility of presenting itself as something it is not. Things don’t only exist but also have ways of presenting themselves. Thus, a misperception only proves the publicity of conscience that is in the world.

When Phenomenology tries to explain the misperception of a bird puppet for a bird the way of reasoning goes like this: “when it happens that we think that we perceive when we are actually imagining, this lack of order can only take place in relation to true perceptions and imaginations. In order to be able to hallucinate, we must have joined the game of intent or aim things. We cannot hallucinate if we weren’t aware of the difference of perceiving and dreaming” (Sokolowski, p.24).

Moreover, objects that do not exist can be real in some sense because they subsist as we have our intentionality directed to them. And, it can also be said that such a reasoning finds its base on Brentano to whom “the intentionality thesis holds out the prospect of understanding the essential nature of thought” (Jaquette, p. 99).

But there is something paradoxical involving Brentano’s concept of intentionality and it regards the immanence of the object in each and every act. Let’s observe Brentano’s quote from Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint where he says that: “every psychic phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called intentional (also indeed mental) in-existence of an object, and which we, although not with an entirely unambiguous expression will call the relation to a content, the direction toward an object (by which here a reality is not understood), or an immanent objectivity. (…)”

Such a quote suggests that immanent intentionality deals with the fact that our intentional object is actually part of a psychological act. This interpretation raised the critique that Brentano was actually embracing psychologism which such a thesis. The critiques came from his students and they also tried to overcome the difficulties of Brentano’s concept of intentionality. Twardowski, Meinong and Husserl were some of these students and critics who later tried to correct Brentano’s intentions.

One of the big difficulties with immanent intentionality is that it makes impossible for two people to think about the same thing. Taking Brentano’s quote from above, we have that the intentionality from an act of thought is directed to its content and not to the actual object. Thus, it follows in a subjectivism and also into a sort of idealism. What is the ontological status of the intentional object? When I perceive a bird on a wire, my act of thought is directed to the mental object of thought and not to the physical object itself – the actual bird. Thus, there is a duplication of objects. But then, if we try to establish that there should be equivalence between mental and physical objects we wouldn’t be able to explain non-existing objects such as illusions or a character in a book or in a TV show.

Least, to Brentano there are three kinds of mental phenomena which are – perceptions, judgments and phenomena of love and hate. Examples of presentation can be: I see a black bird standing on an electric wire (…) or I see the cats sleeping on the sofa; I imagine a toothless purple monster; or, I am looking for an available apartment in some street in Tel Aviv. Presentations are the most basic mental acts and relate to something we see, imagine, expect, remember, etc.

Judgments and phenomena of love and hate are based on presentations but the first involves a qualitative mode of acceptance or denial towards the existence of the object; and the second involves emotions, desires and acts of will. An example of judgment can be given by There isn’t a black bird standing on the wire and I see there is coffee on the table. And an example of phenomena of love and hate is I like George’s character from Seinfield or I wish I had a car and even I’m afraid of the dog which is standing with its mouth opened in front of me.

References:

Copenhaver, Rebecca. Thomas Reid’s Philosophy of Mind: Consciousness and Intentionality. In Philosophy Compass.

Sokolowski, Robert. Introdução à Fenomenologia. (Introduction to Phenomenology)

Heidegger, Martin. Ser e Tempo. (Being and Time)

Jacquette, Dale. Brentano’s concept of Intentionality. In Cambridge Companion to Brentano.


Heidegger.

abril 27, 2010

“« Les autres » ne désignent pas la totalité de ce que je ne suis pas, de ce dont je me distingue ; au contraire, les autres sont plutôt ceux dont le plus souvent on ne se distingue pas soi-même et parmi lesquels on se trouve aussi. Le monde auquel je suis est toujours un monde que je partage avec d’autres, parce que l’être-au-monde est un être-au-monde-avec… Le monde de l’être-là est un monde commun. L’être-là… est un être-avec-autrui. L’Etre en soi intramondain d’autrui est coexistence. “ Heidegger, L’Être et le Temps (1927), Paris, Gallimard, 1964, p.150.


Seguir

Obtenha todo post novo entregue na sua caixa de entrada.

Join 415 other followers